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Device to implement precommitment by restricting one's future options
A commitment device is a mechanism or arrangement that implements precommitment by deliberately restricting one’s own future options in order to make
Commitment_device
Human behavior pattern in which the participant takes on increasing risk
Escalation of commitment is a pattern of decision-making in which individuals or groups continue to invest in a chosen course of action despite mounting
Escalation_of_commitment
Logical paradox in decision-making theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Paradox_of_tolerance
Paper-and-pencil game for two players
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Tic-tac-toe
Decision rule used for minimizing the possible loss for a worst-case scenario
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Minimax
American internet company
users to make commitment contracts in order to reach their personal goals. stickK users set up a "commitment contract", a commitment device where they agree
StickK
Solution concept of a non-cooperative game
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Nash_equilibrium
Standard example in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Prisoner's_dilemma
Hand game for two players or more
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Rock_paper_scissors
Search algorithm
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Alpha–beta_pruning
Israeli-American psychologist and economist (1934–2024)
could not be more important, namely, that human reason left to its own devices is apt to engage in a number of fallacies and systematic errors, so if
Daniel_Kahneman
Overuse of a shared resource
1172133. PMID 19628857. S2CID 39710673. Rachlin, H.; Green, L. (1972). "Commitment, choice, and self-control". Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior
Tragedy_of_the_commons
Mathematical models of strategic interactions
agreeably without resorting to fighting. Moreover, war may arise because of commitment problems: if two countries wish to settle a dispute via peaceful means
Game_theory
Situation where total gains match total losses
assign probabilities to their respective actions, and then use a random device which, according to these probabilities, chooses an action for them. Each
Zero-sum_game
Love focused on feelings
love—in the sense of "being in love", or passionate love—evolved as a "commitment device" which overrides rationality to suppress the search for alternative
Romance
Hand game for two or more players
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Chopsticks_(hand_game)
Finding an optimal algorithm for playing chess
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Solving_chess
Two-player coordination game in game theory
observed randomizing device, then they might decide to correlate their strategies in the game based on the outcome of the device. For example, if the
Battle of the sexes (game theory)
Battle_of_the_sexes_(game_theory)
Theorem in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Aumann's_agreement_theorem
Weakly optimal allocation of resources
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Pareto_efficiency
English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation"
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Tit_for_tat
Concept in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Shapley_value
Concept in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Focal_point_(game_theory)
Game whose outcome can be correctly predicted
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Solved_game
Making of satisfactory, not optimal, decisions
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Bounded_rationality
Model of conflict for two players in game theory
Russians sought to deter American attack by building a "doomsday machine", a device that would trigger world annihilation if Russia was hit by nuclear weapons
Chicken_(game)
Situation where all parties are worse off
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
No-win_situation
Tendency to overestimate in auctions
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Winner's_curse
Political model of international conflict resolution
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Two-level_game_theory
Hungarian and American mathematician and physicist (1903–1957)
function to be placed at any position in the causal chain from the measurement device to the "subjective consciousness" of the human observer. In other words
John_von_Neumann
Condition in economics and game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Perfect_information
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
List_of_games_in_game_theory
Pairing where no unchosen pair prefers each other over their choice
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Stable_matching_problem
Diplomatic policy of concessions
Nationalist faction (Germany and Italy) could not have broken a non-binding commitment, and they walked out at least once. The Republic was not even allowed
Appeasement
Hungarian-American economist and philosopher (1920–2000)
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
John_Harsanyi
Experimental tool
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Dictator_game
Proof all ranked voting rules have spoilers
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Arrow's_impossibility_theorem
Problem in process of sharing surplus
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Cooperative_bargaining
Decrease in severity of conflicts
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
De-escalation
Notion in combinatorial game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Game_complexity
Solution concept in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Evolutionarily stable strategy
Evolutionarily_stable_strategy
Israeli-American mathematician (born 1930)
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Robert_Aumann
Model of humans as rational, self-interested agents
build into its assumptions the notion that people can give credible commitments to a course of conduct. He demonstrates the absurdity with the narrowness
Homo_economicus
Game theory scenario
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Win–win_game
Economic model
More generally, the leader must have commitment power. Moving observably first is the most obvious means of commitment: once the leader has made its move
Stackelberg_competition
Israeli psychologist (1937–1996)
under uncertainty whether they like it or not..... Man is a deterministic device thrown into a probabilistic Universe. In this match, surprises are expected
Amos_Tversky
Simple mathematical game
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Pirate_game
Type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Separating_equilibrium
time. Another example is to build excess production capacity as a commitment device. Due to the often ambiguous nature of cost in production, it may be
Limit_price
Combinatorial game theory theorem
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Sprague–Grundy_theorem
Principle in economics and game theory
equilibria:[citation needed] for every arbitrary coordinating device a.k.a. correlating, there exists another direct device for which the state space equals the action
Revelation_principle
Branch of game theory about two-player sequential games with perfect information
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Combinatorial_game_theory
Representation of a game in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Normal-form_game
Complete plan on how a game player will behave in every possible game situation
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Strategy_(game_theory)
Conflict between safety and cooperation
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Stag_hunt
Statement that players know and also know that other players know (ad infinitum)
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Common_knowledge_(logic)
Term in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Move_by_nature
Economic model
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Cournot_competition
Game in economic experiments
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Ultimatum_game
Cooperation between firms to limit competition
including Apple and Samsung, to be the default search engine on their devices. Another lawsuit filed by nearly 40 attorneys general on Dec. 17, 2020
Collusion
Class of strategies employed in a repeated non-cooperative game
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Trigger_strategy
Game theory concept
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Subgame_perfect_equilibrium
Search heuristic for combinatorial games
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Aspiration_window
When a decision-maker's future preferences can contradict earlier preferences
subgame imperfect. In this context, the inconsistency is primarily about commitment and credible threats. This manifests itself through a violation of Bellman's
Dynamic_inconsistency
Concept in conflict studies
management Friedrich Glasl's model of conflict escalation Escalation of commitment Stability–instability paradox Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc (1987)
Conflict_escalation
Preference of known risks to unknown risks
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Ambiguity_aversion
Dynamical system
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Replicator_equation
Class of theorems about Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games
equilibrium. Many other folk theorems have been proved in settings with commitment. In mathematics, the term folk theorem refers generally to any theorem
Folk_theorem_(game_theory)
In board games that cannot end in a draw, one of the two players has a winning strategy
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Zermelo's theorem (game theory)
Zermelo's_theorem_(game_theory)
Field of economics and game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Mechanism_design
Game theory concept
"Defense and security planning under resource uncertainty and multi-period commitments". Naval Research Logistics. 69 (7): 1009–1026. doi:10.1002/nav.22071
Bayesian_game
Game-theoretic concept
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Cheap_talk
Facilitating a peaceful outcome to a dispute
in health. Collaborating may be the best solution when consensus and commitment of other parties is important; when the conflict occurs in a collaborative
Conflict_resolution
Mathematical game
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Guess_2/3_of_the_average
Game with a dominant mutually most beneficial action
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Deadlock_(game_theory)
Resource distribution game
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Blotto_game
Level of information in economics and game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Complete_information
Quality of a strategy in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Strategic_dominance
Variation of minimax game tree search
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Negamax
Economic phenomenon
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Tyranny_of_small_decisions
Zero-sum game where competitions between strategies contain a cycle
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Intransitive_game
Neologism for cooperative competition
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Coopetition
Concept in game theory
not be in his best interest to do so. A threat, and its counterpart – a commitment, are both defined by American economist and Nobel prize winner, T.C. Schelling
Non-credible_threat
Concept in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Incentive_compatibility
Variant of Nash equilibrium in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Trembling_hand_perfect_equilibrium
Game illustrating paradox in rational choice theory
average).[citation needed] All-pay auction Bidding fee auction Escalation of commitment Tragedy of the commons War of attrition (game) Shubik: 1971. Page 109
Dollar_auction
Military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Deterrence_theory
are that it involves a commitment from the player, meaning the player can only restrict their own choices and that the commitment has to be credible, meaning
Strategic_move
Evolution and neuroscience of romantic love
variety of explanations for romantic love. Romantic love is a powerful commitment device. Romantic love suppresses the search for alternative mates (even irrationally
Biology_of_romantic_love
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Transferable_utility
Concept in economics and game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Global_game
Simultaneous game found in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Coordination_game
Poker game developed by Harold Kuhn
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Kuhn_poker
Italian economist (born 1961)
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Pierpaolo_Battigalli
Solution to the fair division problem
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Moving-knife_procedure
Simple game studied in game theory
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Matching_pennies
Game theory concept
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Game_form
Economic model of competition
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Bertrand_competition
Paradox of combining strategies
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Parrondo's_paradox
Experimental economics game
equilibrium Strategies Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Public_goods_game
COMMITMENT DEVICE
COMMITMENT DEVICE
Girl/Female
Gujarati, Hindu, Indian, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Telugu
Strategy; Idea; Trick; Solution; A Device; Planning
Surname or Lastname
English (southwest and South Wales)
English (southwest and South Wales) : metonymic nickname for a cunning or crafty person, from Middle English trick ‘strategem’, ‘device’ (from a Norman form of Old French triche).
Surname or Lastname
English (chiefly Kent and Sussex)
English (chiefly Kent and Sussex) : occupational name for a designer or engineer, from a Middle English reduced form of Old French engineor ‘contriver’ (a derivative of engaigne ‘cunning’, ‘ingenuity’, ‘stratagem’, ‘device’). Engineers in the Middle Ages were primarily designers and builders of military machines, although in peacetime they might turn their hands to architecture and other more pacific functions.German : from the Latin personal name Januarius (see January 1). Jänner is a South German word for ‘January’, and so it is possible that this is one of the surnames acquired from words denoting months of the year, for example by converts who had been baptized in that month, people who were born or baptized in that month, or people whose taxes were due in January.
Girl/Female
Arabic, Muslim
Commitment; Pledge; Delegation
Male
English
English surname transferred to forename use, from a place name in Berkshire originally called Windels-ora, WINDSOR means "landing place with a windlass." [note: windlass. naut. a device used for winding ropes.]Â
Surname or Lastname
English (of Norman origin)
English (of Norman origin) : nickname for a crafty or ingenious person, from a reduced form of Old French engaine ‘ingenuity’, ‘trickery’ (Latin ingenium ‘native wit’). The word was also used in a concrete sense of a stratagem or device, particularly a trap.This surname has also assimilated reduced variants of Welsh Gurganus.
Girl/Female
Muslim
Commitment, Pledge, Delegation
Surname or Lastname
English
English : habitational name from a place in East Yorkshire near Bridlington, so named from Old English hearpe ‘harp’ (the instrument or the device used for purifying sea salt) + hÄm ‘homestead’.
Surname or Lastname
English
English : metonymic occupational name for a player of a musical instrument (any musical instrument, not necessarily what is now known as an organ), from Middle English organ (Old French organe, Late Latin organum ‘device’, ‘(musical) instrument’, Greek organon ‘tool’, from ergein ‘to work or do’).English : from a rare medieval personal name, attested only in the Latinized forms Organus (masculine) and Organa (feminine). Its etymology is obscure; it may be a reworking of a Celtic name.French : habitational name from a place in the Hautes Pyrénées named Organ.
COMMITMENT DEVICE
COMMITMENT DEVICE
Boy/Male
Tamil
God of Yoga (Lord Shiva), One who practices Yoga
Girl/Female
Hindu, Indian
Moon
Biblical
an assembly,ornament,ornament, beauty
Boy/Male
Hindu, Indian, Marathi
To Come Forth; Appear
Boy/Male
Hindu, Indian, Marathi, Punjabi, Sikh
Whole; Entire
Surname or Lastname
English
English : habitational name from either of two places called Benington, in Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire, or from Long Bennington in Lincolnshire. The first is recorded in Domesday Book as Benintone ‘farmstead or settlement (Old English tūn) by the Beane river’; both Lincolnshire names are derived from the Old English personal name Beonna + -ing-, a connective particle denoting association, + tūn.
Female
English
Contracted form of Spanish Therasia, THERESA means "harvester." Also in use by the English and Portuguese.
Boy/Male
Arabic, British, Malaysian
Glow
Boy/Male
Muslim
Migrator
Boy/Male
Tamil
Venimadhav | வேநிமாதவ
Lord Krishna
COMMITMENT DEVICE
COMMITMENT DEVICE
COMMITMENT DEVICE
COMMITMENT DEVICE
COMMITMENT DEVICE
n.
The act of committing, or putting in charge, keeping, or trust; consignment; esp., the act of committing to prison.
n.
One who, or that which, unloads; a device for unloading, as hay from a wagon.
n.
A warrant or order for the imprisonment of a person; -- more frequently termed a mittimus.
n.
The act of referring or intrusting to a committee for consideration and report; as, the commitment of a petition or a bill.
a.
Full of devices; inventive.
n.
A sly trick or device; as, an undercraft of authors.
n.
To heal; to remedy; to cure; to make good; to soothe, as with an ointment, especially by some device, trick, or quibble; to gloss over.
n.
A doing, or perpetration, in a bad sense, as of a crime or blunder; commission.
n.
A device in a candlestick to hold the ends of candles, so that they be burned.
n.
A precept or warrant granted by a justice for committing to prison a party charged with crime; a warrant of commitment to prison.
n.
The act of remanding; the order for recommitment.
n.
A device emblematic of union, used on a national flag or ensign, sometimes, as in the military standard of Great Britain, covering the whole field; sometimes, as in the flag of the United States, and the English naval and marine flag, occupying the upper inner corner, the rest of the flag being called the fly. Also, a flag having such a device; especially, the flag of Great Britain.
n.
Fig.: A snare; an ambush; a stratagem; any device by which one may be caught unawares.
n.
Work or devices suitable to be concealed; a secret stratagem.
n.
The act of committing, or the state of being committed; commitment.
n.
The act of pledging or engaging; the act of exposing, endangering, or compromising; also, the state of being pledged or engaged.
n.
The decorations and fittings of a stage, representing the place in which the action is supposed to go on; one of the slides, or other devices, used to give an appearance of reality to the action of a play; as, to paint scenes; to shift the scenes; to go behind the scenes.
n.
Alt. of Recommittal
adv.
In a deviceful manner.
n.
A second or renewed commitment; a renewed reference to a committee.