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Solution concept in game theory
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) that is impermeable when adopted by a population in adaptation to a specific
Evolutionarily stable strategy
Evolutionarily_stable_strategy
Condition where selection restores genetic composition
A population can be described as being in an evolutionarily stable state when that population's "genetic composition is restored by selection after a
Evolutionarily_stable_state
Game theory model of aggression
model was originally formulated by John Maynard Smith; a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was determined by Bishop & Cannings. An example is
War_of_attrition_(game)
Pairing where no unchosen pair prefers each other over their choice
mathematics, economics, and computer science, the stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized sets of elements
Stable_matching_problem
Finding an optimal algorithm for playing chess
solved at least weakly. Calculated estimates of game-tree complexity and state-space complexity of chess exist which provide a bird's eye view of the computational
Solving_chess
Logical paradox in decision-making theory
Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 86(344), 346–359. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30091841 Blumner, Robyn E. (August–September 2016). "Is My Intolerance of
Paradox_of_tolerance
Theorem in game theory
interpretation is that when state s ∈ S {\displaystyle s\in S} is drawn, agent a {\displaystyle a} learns (only) that the state lies in π a {\displaystyle
Aumann's_agreement_theorem
In game theory, a stochastically stable equilibrium is a refinement of the evolutionarily stable state in evolutionary game theory, proposed by Dean Foster
Stochastically stable equilibrium
Stochastically_stable_equilibrium
Solution concept of a non-cooperative game
above there are both stable and unstable equilibria. The equilibria involving mixed strategies with 100% probabilities are stable. If either player changes
Nash_equilibrium
Overuse of a shared resource
Oosterhout, Gretchen (2000). An Evolutionary Simulation of the Tragedy of the Commons (PhD dissertation). Portland State University. doi:10.15760/etd.1250
Tragedy_of_the_commons
Standard example in game theory
shown that unfair ZD strategies are not evolutionarily stable. The key intuition is that an evolutionarily stable strategy must not only be able to invade
Prisoner's_dilemma
Application of game theory to evolving populations in biology
Some attractors (all global asymptotically stable fixed points) of the equations are evolutionarily stable states. A strategy which can survive all "mutant"
Evolutionary_game_theory
Concept in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Shapley_value
Model of conflict for two players in game theory
strategies. Either the pure, or mixed, Nash equilibria will be evolutionarily stable strategies depending upon whether uncorrelated asymmetries exist
Chicken_(game)
Game whose outcome can be correctly predicted
1109/TCIAIG.2015.2420191. ISSN 1943-068X. Allis, Beating the World Champion? The state-of-the-art in computer game playing. in New Approaches to Board Games Research
Solved_game
Decision rule used for minimizing the possible loss for a worst-case scenario
worst possible result is then no payment. However, this solution is not stable, since if B believes A will choose A2 then B will choose B1 to gain 1; then
Minimax
English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation"
ethologists and evolutionary psychologists to apply tit-for-tat strategies to explain why altruism evolves in many animal communities. Evolutionary game theory
Tit_for_tat
Model of humans as rational, self-interested agents
discussion. In its standard formulation, the model assumes that individuals have stable preferences, access to relevant information, and seek to maximize utility
Homo_economicus
Mathematical models of strategic interactions
that would be maintained by evolutionary forces. The best-known equilibrium in biology is known as the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), first introduced
Game_theory
Level of information in economics and game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Complete_information
Topics referred to by the same term
nuclear research facility Euthyroid sick syndrome Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Explained sum of squares Effective sample
ESS
Concept in game theory
not know which one of them is which, then the mixed Nash is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), as play is confined to the bottom left to top right
Best_response
Tendency to overestimate in auctions
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Winner's_curse
Concept in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Focal_point_(game_theory)
Israeli psychologist (1937–1996)
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Amos_Tversky
Search algorithm
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Alpha–beta_pruning
Dynamical system
set of evolutionarily stable states of the population. In general nondegenerate cases, there can be at most one interior evolutionary stable state (ESS)
Replicator_equation
Problem in process of sharing surplus
emergence of human attitudes toward distributive justice. He primarily uses evolutionary game theory to explain how individuals come to believe that proposing
Cooperative_bargaining
Game theory solution
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Correlated_equilibrium
Hand game for two or more players
between more than two hands, so long as the resulting state is different from the original state. Single Division: The player can transfer fingers from
Chopsticks_(hand_game)
Trigger strategy
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Grim_trigger
Situation where total gains match total losses
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Zero-sum_game
Paper-and-pencil game for two players
perfectly or to enumerate the 765 essentially different positions (the state space complexity) or the 26,830 possible games up to rotations and reflections
Tic-tac-toe
Complete plan on how a game player will behave in every possible game situation
and extended form games. Nash equilibrium Haven (graph theory) Evolutionarily stable strategy Ben Polak Game Theory: Lecture 1 Transcript ECON 159, 5
Strategy_(game_theory)
Weakly optimal allocation of resources
optimum water content Social Choice and Individual Values by Kenneth Arrow Stable marriage problem Trade-off talking rational economic person (TOTREP) Welfare
Pareto_efficiency
Formal rule for predicting how a game will be played
ISBN 978-0-521-89943-7. Thomas, B. (1985a) On evolutionary stable sets. J. Math. Biol. 22:105–115. Thomas, B. (1985b) Evolutionary stable sets in mixed-strategist models
Solution_concept
Game where a certain player can force a win with perfect play
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
First-player and second-player win
First-player_and_second-player_win
Facilitating a peaceful outcome to a dispute
necessary for survival, giving it a strong evolutionary value. A further focus of this is among species that have stable social units, individual relationships
Conflict_resolution
Argument in combinatorial game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Strategy-stealing_argument
Modelling evolution using differential equations
evolutionary biology. An important concept of evolutionary game theory as applied in biology is the evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. This is important because
Evolutionary_dynamics
Non-zero-sum game thought experiment
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Traveler's_dilemma
Hand game for two players or more
competition can lead to rock paper scissors dynamics from a relatively general evolutionary model. The general nature of this basic non-transitive model is widely
Rock_paper_scissors
Game that repeats a base game
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Repeated_game
Simultaneous game found in game theory
Unlike the pure Nash equilibria, the mixed equilibrium is not an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). The mixed Nash equilibrium is also Pareto dominated
Coordination_game
Condition in economics and game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Perfect_information
Enhancement of Alpha–Beta game tree search
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Principal_variation_search
Resource distribution game
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Blotto_game
Game where groups of players may enforce cooperative behaviour
unique vector. The core is contained in any stable set, and if the core is stable it is the unique stable set; see (Driessen 1988) for a proof. For simple
Cooperative_game_theory
Variant of Nash equilibrium in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Trembling_hand_perfect_equilibrium
Simple game studied in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Matching_pennies
Problem in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
El_Farol_Bar_problem
English mathematician and game theorist born 1940
contributions to the foundations of game theory, experimental economics, evolutionary game theory and analytical philosophy. He took up economics after holding
Kenneth_Binmore
Situation where all parties are worse off
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
No-win_situation
Solution concept in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Rationalizable_strategy
Simple mathematical game
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Pirate_game
Human behavior pattern in which the participant takes on increasing risk
when subjects view current issues as having unstable reasoning rather than stable reasoning, or when the individual is unwilling to admit mistakes. They then
Escalation_of_commitment
Poker game developed by Harold Kuhn
Press. pp. 97–103. James Peck. "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium" (PDF). Ohio State University. Retrieved 2 September 2016. Szafron, Duane; Gibson, Richard;
Kuhn_poker
Game illustrating paradox in rational choice theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Dollar_auction
Israeli-American psychologist and economist (1934–2024)
then moved to Mandatory Palestine in 1948, just before the creation of the state of Israel. Kahneman wrote of his experience in Nazi-occupied France, explaining
Daniel_Kahneman
Subset of a game; used in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Subgame
Concept in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Strong_Nash_equilibrium
Game class in game theory
local maxima of the potential function (Figure 3). The only stochastically stable equilibrium is (+1, +1), the global maximum of the potential function. A
Potential_game
Concept in conflict studies
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Conflict_escalation
Preference of known risks to unknown risks
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Ambiguity_aversion
Quality of a strategy in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Strategic_dominance
Two-player coordination game in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Battle of the sexes (game theory)
Battle_of_the_sexes_(game_theory)
Economic phenomenon
Depending on the issue, decision-making may be appropriate at a local, state, country or global level. However, organisations at these levels can entangle
Tyranny_of_small_decisions
Concept in game theory
relevant in evolutionary game theory, where the different methods of equilibrium selection respond to different ideas of what equilibria will be stable and persistent
Equilibrium_selection
Set in game theory
coalition having at least (n+1)/2 members has an empty core. That is, no stable coalition exists. Consider a group of n miners, who have discovered large
Core_(game_theory)
Military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons
is unlike compellence, which is the attempt to get an actor (such as a state) to take an action (i.e. alter the status quo). Both are forms of coercion
Deterrence_theory
Mathematical game
readers, who reached the same number of points in previous puzzles, to state an integer between 1 and 1,000,000,000. The winner was the one who guessed
Guess_2/3_of_the_average
a crucial role in determining which Nash equilibria qualify as evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in coordination games and discoordination games
Uncorrelated_asymmetry
assumed that the grand coalition forms and the purpose of the game is to find stable imputations. Mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution P
Glossary_of_game_theory
Game whose payoffs depend on strategies as opposed to players
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Symmetric_game
Canadian computer scientist and mathematician
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Donald_B._Gillies
Notion in combinatorial game theory
Combinatorial game theory measures game complexity in several ways: State-space complexity (the number of legal game positions from the initial position)
Game_complexity
Point in evolutionary space where selection always leads
selection, such as an evolutionarily stable strategy, other possibilities are available. Because identification of an evolutionary attractor on its own
Evolutionary_attractor
Representation of a game in game theory
perspective; see Chapter 3. Downloadable free online. Weibull, J. (1996). Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-23181-6. J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern
Normal-form_game
Solution to the fair division problem
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Moving-knife_procedure
Solution concept in Game Theory
)} of observing the joint signal t ∈ T {\displaystyle t\in T} when the state of the world is θ ∈ Θ {\displaystyle \theta \in \Theta } . By joining those
Bayes_correlated_equilibrium
Political model of international conflict resolution
perceived to be large, the opposing state will, therefore, have greater bargaining power. Alternatively, if a state's win-set is perceived to be rather
Two-level_game_theory
Variation of minimax game tree search
using negamax function above function think(boardState) is allMoves := generateLegalMoves(boardState) bestMove := null bestEvaluation := -∞ for each move
Negamax
Diplomatic policy of concessions
dissenters such as future Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War Duff Cooper, and future Prime Minister Anthony Eden. Appeasement
Appeasement
Proof all ranked voting rules have spoilers
to occur in practice. Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2023-03-14). "Stable Voting". Constitutional Political Economy. 34 (3): 421–433. arXiv:2108.00542
Arrow's_impossibility_theorem
Game theory concept
extensive game with complete information (all players know the complete state of the game) and perfect recall (each player remembers all their previous
Subgame_perfect_equilibrium
Hungarian and American mathematician and physicist (1903–1957)
Uchaikin, Vladimir V.; Zolotarev, Vladimir M. (1999). Chance and Stability: Stable Distributions and their Applications. De Gruyter. pp. xviii, 281, 424. doi:10
John_von_Neumann
In board games that cannot end in a draw, one of the two players has a winning strategy
take alternate turns; and there is no chance element present. Zermelo has stated that there are many games of this type; however his theorem has been applied
Zermelo's theorem (game theory)
Zermelo's_theorem_(game_theory)
Concept in game theory
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Incentive_compatibility
Mathematical modelling of phenotypic evolution
function where finite evolutionary steps lead past the local 'flatness'. Second, a fitness maximum which is known as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
Evolutionary invasion analysis
Evolutionary_invasion_analysis
American economist (born 1939)
negative synergy" between economic incentives and moral behavior, further stating: "The fine seems to have undermined the parents' sense of ethical obligation
Samuel_Bowles_(economist)
the Evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. As the authors argued, "Beliefs determine Behavior. Behavior determines payoff. From an evolutionary perspective
Conjectural_variation
Concept in game theory
defined by American economist and Nobel prize winner, T.C. Schelling, who stated that: "A announces that B's behaviour will lead to a response from A. If
Non-credible_threat
Games Evolutionarily stable set Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium
List_of_games_in_game_theory
American computer scientist and mathematician
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Jennifer_Tour_Chayes
Class of strategies employed in a repeated non-cooperative game
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Trigger_strategy
Concept in game theory
focal points than asymmetric equilibria. Markov perfect equilibria are not stable with respect to small changes in the game itself. A small change in payoffs
Markov_perfect_equilibrium
Problem about bus travel
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Wait/walk_dilemma
Game theory concept
Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Game_form
Making of satisfactory, not optimal, decisions
The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. Elster, Jon (1983). Sour Grapes:
Bounded_rationality
Game in economic experiments
offer. Other authors have used evolutionary game theory to explain behavior in the ultimatum game. Simple evolutionary models, e.g. the replicator dynamics
Ultimatum_game
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STATE
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STATE
Female
English
Feminine variant spelling of English unisex Stacey, STACEE means "resurrection."
Boy/Male
Vietnamese
Stable.
Boy/Male
Indian, Punjabi, Sikh
Stable
Male
French
French name derived from Latin amabilis, AMABLE means "lovable."
Boy/Male
Indian, Sanskrit
Stable
Surname or Lastname
English, Dutch, North German, and Danish
English, Dutch, North German, and Danish : variant of Stubbe.
Surname or Lastname
English (Devon and Cornwall)
English (Devon and Cornwall) : habitational name from Scoble in Devon.
Boy/Male
Hindu
Stable
Boy/Male
Shakespearean American English
Henry VI, Part 2' Sir John Stanley. 'King Henry the Sixth, Part III' Sir William Stanley. 'King...
Boy/Male
Tamil
Stable
Surname or Lastname
English
English : variant of Staple.
Surname or Lastname
English
English : occupational name for someone who looked after horses or cattle, from an agent derivative of Middle English stable ‘stable’.German (Stäbler) : occupational name for an official who carried a staff as a symbol of office, Middle High German stebelære.
Surname or Lastname
English
English : topographic name for someone who lived near a boundary post, from Middle English stapel ‘post’ + the suffix -er, denoting an inhabitant.
Surname or Lastname
English
English : topographic name for someone who lived by a stable, or an occupational name for someone employed in one, from Middle English stable, plural stables (via Old French from Latin stabulum, a derivative of stare ‘to stand’). In Middle English the term was used of the quarters occupied by cattle as well as those reserved for horses.
Female
English
Variant spelling of English Mabel, MABLE means "lovable."Â
Female
English
Elaborated form of English Star, STARLA means "star."
Female
English
Feminine variant spelling of English unisex Stacey, STACIE means "resurrection."
Female
English
English name derived from the vocabulary word, SABLE means "black," as a heraldic color. It is sometimes confused with the mammal of the same name but which has brown fur, not black, and which has a different origin.
Surname or Lastname
English
English : from Middle English stapel ‘post’, hence a topographic name for someone who lived near a boundary post, or a habitational name from some place named with this word (Old English stapel), as for example Staple in Kent or Staple Fitzpaine in Somerset.Americanized spelling of German Stapel.
Surname or Lastname
English (Durham)
English (Durham) : unexplained
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STATE
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STATE
Biblical
who sucks, or lives on milk
Boy/Male
Arabic, Muslim, Pashtun
Loving Flowers
Female
English
Variant spelling of English Ailsa, AILSIE means "elf victory."
Boy/Male
Hindu, Indian, Marathi, Sanskrit
Prudent
Girl/Female
British, English
Loveable
Surname or Lastname
English
English : from a pet form of Day.
Girl/Female
Gujarati, Hindu, Indian, Kannada, Sanskrit, Tamil
Musical Rhythm
Surname or Lastname
English
English : patronymic from a medieval form of the personal name Ralph.
Girl/Female
Gujarati, Hindu, Indian, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Tamil, Telugu
Bright; A Decree; Command
Girl/Female
Arabic, Muslim
Full Moon of the Women
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STATE
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STATE
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STATE
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STATE
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STATE
v. i.
Firmly established; not easily moved, shaken, or overthrown; fixed; as, a stable government.
v. i.
Durable; not subject to overthrow or change; firm; as, a stable foundation; a stable position.
a.
Being of reasonable or suitable size; as, sizable timber; sizable bulk.
n.
A stable keeper.
a.
Not stable; not standing fast or firm; unstable; prone to change or recede from a purpose; mutable; inconstant.
v. t.
To form into a table or catalogue; to tabulate; as, to table fines.
v. t.
To put or keep in a stable.
v. i.
To dwell or lodge in a stable; to dwell in an inclosed place; to kennel.
n.
The fur of the sable.
imp. & p. p.
of Stale
imp. & p. p.
of Sable
n.
The company assembled round a table.
v. t.
To sort according to its staple; as, to staple cotton.
n.
The fiber of wool, cotton, flax, or the like; as, a coarse staple; a fine staple; a long or short staple.
a.
Relating to evolution; as, evolutionary discussions.
a.
Liable to, or subjected by law to, taxation; as, ratable estate.
a.
Pertaining to, or being market of staple for, commodities; as, a staple town.
adv.
In a stable manner; firmly; fixedly; steadily; as, a government stably settled.
v. i.
A house, shed, or building, for beasts to lodge and feed in; esp., a building or apartment with stalls, for horses; as, a horse stable; a cow stable.
imp. & p. p.
of Stable